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Poland in the World:
Challenges, Achievements, Threats
Polish foreign policy has attracted a great deal of interest from the internation-
al community. It is claimed that the world press has not paid so much attention to
Poland since the 1980s, the Solidarity movement and the Round Table discussions.
Reactions to Polish policy have varied. Many publications have expressed sur-
prise at the emergence of an important new player on the international scene.
Some views have been positive, such as The Wall Street Journal’s, which referred
to Poland as a global player. Other publications in the European press were less
favourable, more ironic and aggressive. One way or the other, all these positive
and negative comments, both serious and tongue-in-cheek, suggest that Polish
foreign policy has moved up considerably. The question now is whether this is
only the result of extraordinary international conditions and coincidences, or
rather a permanent reinforcement of the position of Poland, its importance and
influence in international relations. Another question is how this change will
affect the most important areas of national security, internal stability and widely
understood opportunities of further growth.
The current interest in Polish policy derives from the decisions of the Polish
government in the face of the Iraq crisis which caused deep rifts in the transat-
lantic community and in Europe. Poland gave strong backing to the policy of the
US administration. The visits of the Polish President, Prime Minister, and Foreign
Minister to Washington D.C. and President George W. Bush’s visit to Poland
marked on-going rapprochement between Poland and the USA. This trend was
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8substantiated when the Polish Prime Minister signed the letter of eight Europe-
an leaders and, subsequently, when Poland decided to send troops to participate
in the military intervention in Iraq and to supervise one of the zones in post-war
Iraq through significant military presence. These choices gave rise to tensions in
relations with our closest European allies. Time will tell whether this portends
serious and far-reaching problems or only temporary strains. Nonetheless, the
successful closing of the accession negotiations and the support of a vast major-
ity of Poles for EU accession were a great success on the European plane.
To conclude this brief outline of the major directions of the Polish foreign
policy, I want to point to significant achievements in regional policy, including
the policy towards our eastern neighbours. Poland is an acclaimed proponent of
many initiatives and a beacon of stability in the region. Our position is clear, our
priorities well defined. Poland has done a great deal to cushion the shock that
may take place in our relations with the eastern neighbours when Poland’s east-
ern border becomes the external border of the European Union. In response to
the changing situation, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has proposed
a new eastern policy for the future enlarged Union and made it clear that Poland
wants to participate actively and constructively in the development and imple-
mentation of the future foreign policy of the European Union. Importantly
enough, thanks to its good relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Polish NGO sector contributed to the debate preceding the drafting of the Polish
proposal of the EU’s eastern policy.
These issues delineate the main aspects of the Polish foreign policy and thus
inform and direct our debate.                                                     Aleksander Smolar
On the Future of Europe
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W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz
There can be no doubt that the position of Poland in international relations
has grown stronger, although we are all aware of the risks intrinsic in our new
role. The main factors which have brought about the present state of affairs
include our position on the Iraq issue. Equally important are the conclusion of
the accession negotiations, the signing of the treaty, and the outcome of the
referendum, as well as how this was brought about. The last moments of the
accession negotiations impressed many observers. We showed that Poland can
stand by well-reasoned truths, not only its own truths but those shared by the
majority, if not all acceding countries. Naturally, the present state of affairs is
due not only to the events of the past months, but also to other initiatives of
ours, including those on the future Eastern policy of the European Union or the
future of the United Nations.
Without a doubt, one of the key factors of our success is the determination
we have shown over the past several years in attaining the main goals of the
foreign policy. I owe a thank you to all those who have made a contribution,
primarily successive Cabinets and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This determina-
tion is unique in Polish politics and is unaffected by diverging views recently
articulated for the first time so sharply, mainly concerning European integration
and our involvement in the Iraq conflict.
It can be said that we have achieved the goals set by Poland in the early
1990s. We are a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we will soon
10
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join the European Union, we have good, even very good relations with our neigh-
bours. We play an important role in various initiatives of regional co-operation.
We have recently put forth proposals on global issues. Moreover, I believe that
our timing and choice of issues have been most appropriate. Does this mean
that we have exhausted the tasks of our diplomacy? Certainly not. We should
clarify the goals for today and for the future in public discussions in various
forums, not only official ones. While many of our efforts are crowned with suc-
cess, there are still threats ahead, including in the areas we have identified as
our priorities.
We have looked to NATO membership as the guardian of our security. Today
we feel safer, though conventional threats are more of theoretical than of real
nature. Does this mean that we are really safe? No – new threats have emerged
or become apparent: international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMDs). We hope that Senator Richard Lugar’s warning will
not come true; a year ago he pointed to potential threats arising from availabil-
ity of WMDs to terrorist organisations. Given their modus operandi and their
aspiration to strike the Western world, if they were to lay their hands of WMDs,
the implications could be most terrifying. Consequently, all measures taken to
prevent this scenario are of paramount importance for us.
With regard to NATO, our efforts follow the decisions of the 2002 Prague
Summit. One the one hand, it was decided to enlarge NATO, a move we had
promoted for years. On the other hand, it was decided to modernise NATO, es-
pecially its defence capability. Several months ago doubts were still being raised
about the political will of the member states necessary to achieve the second
goal. George Robertson himself on a number of occasions expressed his disap-
pointment with lack of progress in discussions and lack of decisions. However,
I am more optimistic now after the June NATO Council meeting in Madrid.
I sense a readiness to take specific actions in national armies, in national de-
fence and security strategies, actions conducive to the goal set for NATO.
Certainly, the enlargement of NATO is a challenge in itself. The new members
need to converge with NATO and shoulder their responsibilities. I hope the pro-
cess will be smooth. At the same time we realise that NATO, like any community
11
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of the Western world, is not free from tensions, conflicts and divergent opin-
ions, especially regarding the Iraq issue. This poses a threat to the reliable guar-
antee offered by the NATO security mechanism. It also suggests that, clearly,
there are different positions on the principles of international law and the prin-
ciples of use of force. There are also clear differences in protecting egoistic inter-
ests. The Iraq dispute demonstrated how easy it is to disrupt transatlantic soli-
darity. The course of action at the UN Security Council was disappointing. I be-
lieve that each permanent member of the Security Council can be said to have
made mistakes in late 2002 and early 2003. Meanwhile, some concepts of pro-
tecting the US security interests proposed in America can undermine the coher-
ence and the traditional mechanisms of NATO. According to such concepts, un-
conventional threats should be addressed by way of forming ad hoc coalitions of
countries ready to oppose the given threat. This implies a selective approach to
NATO. NATO is now often referred to as a toolbox; those instruments that are
most useful and best fit the circumstances are to be used. There is certainly
a logic to this line of reasoning but it is destructive to the crucial issue of uphold-
ing NATO’s traditional capacities and credibility as a defence alliance.
A warning signal was sent when Turkey faced trouble asking for guarantees
in the case of a potential threat during military operations in Iraq. We remember
how the mechanism of the alliance’s positive response to a request of an ally
failed. This was worrying. Yet we need to realise that a lesson was learnt. When
Poland asked the alliance for assistance in our involvement in Iraq, the decision
was made swiftly and unanimously. And so we are safer: on the one hand, our
security is strewn with new threats, on the other hand, it is in our interest that
NATO should modernise while preserving its credibility.
The Iraq issue is also related to other tensions and conflicts in transatlantic
relations, ones not directly involving security issues. A debate is underway on
both sides of the Atlantic on the policy towards the partners across the ocean.
There are – to put it simply – two types of European positions. Some Europeans,
while noticing problems in transatlantic relations, speak in favour of close co-
operation; others, in many different ways, argue for the need of Europe’s identi-
ty, self-sufficiency, or autonomy, which more or less explicitly points to a situa-
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1 Polska miêdzy Europ¹ a Stanami Zjednoczonymi, a debate featuring W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz,
Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, Janusz Reiter, Jan Maria Rokita and Aleksander Smolar, 17 May 2001,
see www.batory.org.pl/debaty or excerpts in Tygodnik Powszechny, 26 August 2001.
tion of rivalry or competition. From our point of view, this situation is very dis-
tressing. The questions we addressed three years ago are being asked all over
again. It was here, at the Stefan Batory Foundation, that we had a debate on
Poland between Europe and the United States.1  Should we make a choice or
not? What kind of choice, in what context and under what conditions? We now
have to revisit these questions again.
Some concepts put forth across the Atlantic are unacceptable. They suggest
that the importance of Europe is diminishing and that Europe is only one of
many world partners to US interests. Such a position could cripple Euro-Ameri-
can co-operation. For fundamental reasons, we are interested in fostering this
co-operation and make sure it is acknowledged. We have consistently taken this
position vis-à-vis our European and American partners, taking advantage of
favourable developments, such as improving relations between Poland and the
USA. Without prejudice to all earlier achievements, our mutual relations have
enjoyed a particularly beneficial climate in the past several months. This was
recognised by certain events and actions, initially of formal nature, such as the
special status of President Aleksander Kwaœniewski’s visit to Washington D.C. in
July 2002. They have gained genuine political currency when President George
W. Bush arrived in Kraków and delivered a significant speech where the US Pres-
ident extended a friendly hand to Europe. It is no secret that we wanted those
words to be spoken and had talked to our US partners about them. We know
that today’s relations between the USA and Poland also owe much to the deci-
sion to purchase US aircraft for the Polish air force, difficult but successful off-set
negotiations, and the prospect of the USA’s growing economic investment in
Poland. All this helps to build and strengthen Polish-American relations and to
stabilise top-level co-operation.
The discussion on transatlantic relation continues; it is difficult to anticipate
its outcome. However, from experience and participation in many debates, I can
tell that after the NATO-EU summit several months ago, after discussions in the
On the Future of Europe
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North-Atlantic Council, and after the EU-USA summit we may speak of a will to
foster co-operation. Certainly, some issues remain controversial, such as the In-
ternational Criminal Court, environmental protection, etc. Sometimes US for-
eign policy on issues of vital importance is unacceptable to Europe, when the US
exerts pressure on European countries, including small countries acceding the
European Union, to force them to go against the grain of the EU’s common
position. Yet, I think we should see things in the right context and look for points
of co-operation and common interests even in areas of difference and divide. In
my opinion, shared interests prevail over differences. We must not allow the
emotions of politicians or their irritation, be it well under control, to create
a new, but in the end virtual reality.
As for the European Union, we have reasons to feel glad though dark clouds
gather on the horizon. I believe that the most important issue ahead is the prep-
aration, execution, and outcome of the Inter-Governmental Conference to adopt
the Constitutional Treaty. We have raised our objections concerning several im-
portant proposals presented by France on behalf of the European Convention in
Thessaloniki. I want to mention only one divergence from the Nice compromise:
the voting system. This is crucial from our perspective. Let me remind you that the
system was developed with great effort in anticipation of EU enlargement: the
goal was to create a decision-making system for the new Union. On the eve of
enlargement, we are told that the adopted solution was wrong. We are told that
the new system may operate for a few years after enlargement but then should be
abolished. Arguments are offered to support the quest for a simpler voting mech-
anism. To my mind, these arguments are artificial: I can see no qualitative differ-
ence between the two systems in terms of complexity. It is proposed that the
weight of one factor affecting the number of votes allocated to each country, that
is the population, be increased; it is not mentioned that this factor plays a key role
in the structure of the European Parliament where it truly belongs.
We cannot accept this proposal, also because Poland has no room for ma-
noeuvre on this point, and we say so frankly to our European partners. In my
opinion, foreign policy can be developed to attain various goals and to protect
one’s interest, but it must never make the fundamental mistake of forgetting
Keynote Address
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the partner, his situation, the limits of his flexibility, borders he can’t cross. More-
over, I think that the new solution was in fact forced through at the Convention;
by initiative of Danuta Hübner, in May 2003 eight and then eighteen countries of
the Convention opposed the proposal put forth by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Yet,
the proposal found its way into the draft Treaty; the explanation was that the
Treaty took so much effort to draft that the deletion of a single provision would
send us back to square one.
I want to stress it once again: we have no room for manoeuvre. Poland is
joining the European Union on terms and conditions set in Nice. Before the ac-
cession referendum many of those who promoted Poland’s accession pointed to
the Nice success and said that it guaranteed our strong position in the European
Council. If the agreement were to be changed, Poland would definitely need
a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Let me remind you that after great
efforts we only managed to mobilise 58 percent of Poles to answer the simple
question: Do you want Poland to join the European Union or not? I don’t think
a referendum on the European Constitution could be successful. If the referen-
dum fails, we will have to open ratification procedures in Parliament. The ratifi-
cation of the European Constitution will probably take place next year, before
the Parliamentary election. Ratification of this Treaty would be tantamount to
accepting a weaker position for Poland in the EU than that approved by Poles in
the accession referendum. I don’t think this Parliament can muster a majority of
two-thirds to pass such decisions; the next Parliament will make it equally diffi-
cult if not impossible. Hence, maintaining the Nice agreement is a precondition
for adopting the European Constitution. We are trying to draw the attention of
our European partners to this issue, one they probably missed, or perhaps un-
derestimated hoping for space for further negotiations or pressure to be exert-
ed to achieve concessions. This situation determines the difficulty intrinsic in
our participation in the Inter-Governmental Conference. Even now it is argued
as follows: if you raise your objections, we’ll raise ours, since everyone has some-
thing to complain about. This will be a politically sensitive moment and Poland
may be depicted as a country missing the logic of integration of the European
Community and causing its disruption.
On the Future of Europe
15
Poland in the World:
Challenges, Achievements, Threats
A brief comment on other areas of European integration. New concepts of
fundamental importance are being proposed today in the European Union. The
Greek Presidency cannot be overestimated. It brings more than the draft Treaty.
The Thessaloniki meeting opened a debate on Mr Javier Solana’s proposal of a
European security strategy. It also made crucial decisions on the West Balkans. It
adopted the final European position on illegal migration. It was during the Greek
Presidency that a position on combating terrorism and a declaration on weap-
ons of mass destruction were adopted. A discussion on “wider Europe” was ini-
tiated, the Mediterranean dialogue was deepened, new initiatives of co-opera-
tion with the Arab world were proposed.
We are taking part in all these efforts. What’s more, we have achievements at
least in some areas. Some have fundamental importance from the point of view
of direct interest of the country, especially foreign policy: the neighbourhood
policy, in this case the Eastern Dimension of the Union; the Balkans; the Middle
East; the Mediterranean. These issues are our priorities. In the months to come
we will approach completion of concepts to be proposed. This is a major task for
our diplomacy.
I have been trying to outline the core issues and to show that great efforts are
still ahead so we will have to be active in diplomacy. I want to briefly mention
some other areas of improvement and success, though many questions remain
open. Take the issue of our relations with Russia. From the initiatives of W³adys³aw
Bartoszewski, to the visit of Vladimir Putin to Poland, to the meeting of Putin and
Kwaœniewski on 28 June this year: the political climate between our countries has
improved. This is of key importance. Meanwhile, we have not so much failed –
that would be an overstatement – but made little progress in co-operation in
many areas, in particular economic co-operation. I think there was no failure: last
year we cut the foreign trade deficit by a quarter. Our exports grew 27 percent in
2002 while imports from Russia fell by several percent, improving our trade bal-
ance. Yet this remains Poland’s greatest trade deficit with any single foreign part-
ner. Trade grew only due to increasing efforts by Polish manufacturers and Polish
exporters. Although President Putin said in Poznañ last year that the issue should
not be a matter of concern to the Polish government only and that the Russian
Keynote Address
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government must help to improve the situation, we have not seen any major
efforts of the Russian government to change the status quo. I could enumerate
many similar examples but I will limit myself to this brief outline.
My last comment. Last year at a Stefan Batory Foundation seminar on social
diplomacy we talked about the activity and the role of non-governmental or-
ganisations and the efforts made by Poland abroad.2  I am proud to say that we
have put some of the ideas discussed at the seminar in practice. The NGO Con-
sultative Council at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in place; once again I want
to thank them for their co-operation. Let me quote one example. A great part of
the Polish non-paper on the Eastern Dimension of the common European poli-
cy3  presented recently by the Polish government was drafted based on propos-
als tabled by the Polish NGOs. Theirs were valuable, creative proposals, far re-
moved from the studies and ideas typically put forward and adopted in the Euro-
pean Union. This public diplomacy should continue. There is space for it not
only in the East. It would be crucial for Polish NGOs to support the actions of the
Polish state in Iraq, especially in the zone we will soon be responsible for. Our
troops and the civilian personnel supporting our military contingent are going
to Iraq in early July after a reconnaissance mission. Obviously, there are many
open questions in Iraq, not only issues of stability and security. This opens a new
area of co-operation.
I said in the beginning that our initiatives also cover global issues. This affects
the perception of Poland. Last year we put forth proposals for the future of the
United Nations. At first they attracted little attention. However, after recent ten-
sions in the UN, the Polish proposals have aroused much greater interest. The
position of some countries has evolved. Russia has moved from indifference to
genuine interest. The USA has confirmed its interest. We have consulted with
several countries; at least two-thirds of them are ready to second our proposals.
We are now drafting a memorandum to be sent to Mr Kofi Anan in the coming
2 Social Diplomacy. The Case of Poland. International Activity of Polish NGO’s and Their Dialogue with
Government, ed. Gra¿yna Czubek, Warsaw 2002.
3 Non-paper with Polish Proposals Concerning Policy Towards New Eastern Neighbours after EU Enlarge-
ment, www.msz.gov.pl.
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weeks. It will report on the consultation process and call for more attention to
be paid to these issues at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly.
I believe that such involvement addresses global interests, including the inter-
ests of Poland, and is evidence that our policy is not unilateral, confined to
a single orientation or bound to a single strategic partner; it is not a policy of
subservience or dependence. As we make these efforts, we believe that the in-
terests of our country fit into broad international interests.
Once again, I realise the risks involved. Not everyone is happy with the devel-
opments around Poland and in Poland. Yet I know, especially in the context of
Iraq, that if the worst-case scenario came true, we could suffer serious political
consequences of the situation. Nonetheless, we are involved in the Iraq issue
not as an adventurer. We’ve made a conscious choice. We’ve made a decision,
though it was very difficult. The President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister and
myself discussed it for hours before coming to a conclusion. This was not politi-
cal adventurism, though we always realised that the situation may not necessar-
ily develop in line with our expectations, with the interests of the Iraqi people,
and with our own interests.
Keynote Address
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Discussion
Jan Krzysztof Bielecki
Minister Cimoszewicz has presented the situation in very circumspect terms.
I think that we are at a very interesting point in history: the role of international
institutions is being redefined. NATO and the UN are good examples. As has
often been pointed out, a group of about fifty democratic countries seems to be
emerging, all guided by the rule of promoting democracy and opposing any
alliances with the enemies of democracy. This is, of course, a far-reaching strate-
gy. I mention it to make clear that there are no easy choices and that a stable
constellation is unlikely to evolve soon. Some say that a spontaneous order will
emerge out of the crises ahead. The international context is very complex as the
global institutional order is changing.
We have heard that Poland wants to participate in this process. Questions
must be asked about the effectiveness, skill, reliability and integrity of our for-
eign policy in the changing world. How can we find our way as a country whose
policy is not totally autonomous, and how can we propose and implement new
solutions? I have some doubts about the effectiveness of our policy. First, I think
that we have too many priorities. For a medium-sized, moderately wealthy coun-
try, we have quite a long list of priorities which we resort to depending on the
actual discussion. We want to participate in the Central European Initiative, the
Vyshehrad Group, the EU-Balkans Initiative. We want to develop the Riga Initia-
tive and be actively involved in the Baltic Council. Not to mention the member-
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ship of institutions and organisations we forget to pay fees to. After all, we can-
not make a sufficient financial contribution to all these initiatives and play a role
that would afford us with our own micro-policy. The Central European Initiative,
a gigantic organisation of 18 countries, has a budget of 2 million dollars paid up
by the Italians. You can’t pursue a policy just by subscribing to an organisation.
You can only pursue a policy if you have a clear vision and the means to bring it
about. This seems simple enough. But we don’t have the necessary resources.
This doesn’t mean that the institutions should be done away with, but we don’t
have to belong to each and every one of them.
I am also concerned about the language of politics in Poland. Other countries
speak a positive language in discussions about the first draft of the European
Constitution. They say, we’re very happy because the draft is in line with our
raison d’état, and we want to support specific solutions in continued work on
the Constitution. Meanwhile, Poland – perhaps under the impression of its Copen-
hagen success – is determined to convince its own citizens and the EU politicians
that frightening Europe with ever-growing Polish problems is an effective tool
of policy making, especially in difficult times. I think it is not a good method.
Moreover, the policy of the state is coupled with individual initiatives of Polish
politicians. Many of them keep arguing against EU accession and treat Europe as
a scarecrow to garner domestic support. In these difficult times we speak a lan-
guage of confrontation, a language which undermines the goals of different
initiatives. I agree with Mr Cimoszewicz in that no one will vote in the referen-
dum on the future Constitution of the EU since we are being told again and
again that everyone is against, that Europe is a source of threats, that we have
no room for manoeuvre. Of course, I realise that the situation is difficult, but
having won so much support for our membership and participation in further
European integration we should all look to use language that supports the mag-
ical term “consensus” and, wherever possible, emphasise benefits rather than
threats, speak a language of opportunities and not losses.
Speaking about the effectiveness of our policies, both domestic and foreign,
we must not forget co-ordination. The European Union is a big exercise in co-
ordination. This is a great challenge for Poland. I don’t want to revisit the prob-
On the Future of Europe
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lems we had in preparing an agricultural subsidies system, but it is a case in
point which illustrates our weaknesses. We have to rework the operating mod-
els of the institutions responsible for European affairs and their mutual interre-
lations. In those countries where co-ordination mechanisms are effective, they
report directly to the Prime Minister (with the exception of Germany). There
should be one centre of command in order to pursue policies effectively.
In summary, I think that our goals should be very clear and specific in these
difficult times; we can’t just rely on values. We also need to bear in mind what
language we speak and whether we are capable of attaining our goals. Other-
wise we will be a paper tiger sending troops by train because there is no plane
to get them there.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki
I agree that the process of attaining the goals we set out for ourselves in the
early 1990s is now approaching completion. But, new problems arise. We, Poles,
thought that NATO membership would give us a guarantee of security. Some
even thought that we didn’t need to keep an army any more. Suddenly NATO
found itself in a new situation and faced new problems. Its future role remains
unknown. We are joining the European Union when it is experiencing a special
change; it is a European Union that has problems with itself and with its recent
principal ally, the United States.
Let me repeat, the process of achieving goals is almost complete, but our
situation has changed. The change was probably triggered by the tragic events
in New York and Washington DC. The terrorist attacks made it clear that the
mightiest superpower could be assailed. Then we faced other new problems.
Unfortunately, as an observer and participant of public debates in Poland, I re-
main unaware of the mechanisms used to make key decisions in Poland. Little is
known of the very difficult debates of the Government and the President con-
cerning key Iraq decisions mentioned by Minister Cimoszewicz. The general public
had the impression that the decisions were made automatically. I criticised it
publicly and I still believe that the decisions were automatic while the present
situation requires at least a moment of reflection.
Discussion
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1 Bez mandatu nie jedŸmy [interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki by Jaros³aw Kurski], Gazeta Wyborcza,
9 May 2003, p. 20.
New concepts proposed in the US for NATO have been mentioned. But the
issue is really about unilateralism and the impact of this stance on US politics
today. How do we develop and continue good relations between Poland and the
USA despite unilateralism, so as not to be just a tool in the tool-box? Aren’t we
just that now? Some of our partners point the finger since they share this con-
cern. I am not a supporter of the decision for Poland to run the occupation zone
in Iraq. But you can’t discuss this issue publicly at all. Everyone is ecstatic about
it, any moment now we will set up the Colonial League! I said that in an inter-
view for Gazeta Wyborcza1  but it seems that the Polish media are bowing to
a kind of political correctness, so the decision cannot be criticised.
I realise that the USA are and will remain a superpower with the casting vote.
But I repeat, even a superpower has to know how to be a partner. The Minister
said that Polish-US relations have improved. I’m afraid we are deluded. One Pres-
ident pats the other President on the back… What difference does it make? How
has Poland benefited from these fantastic relations? I ask this question but at
the same time I note positive Polish diplomatic initiatives. We need a consensus
about our foreign policy. But I have many doubts.
You asked, “What if we fail?” Everything suggests that guerrilla warfare is
about to be unleashed in Iraq. What if the US take another step in pre-emptive
warfare? Do we have a consistent position? Can we say “no”? These are my fun-
damental questions. Please don’t think that I’m an enemy of the USA, I just don’t
want my country to be yet another satellite of the USA.
I agree that dropping the Nice compromise is very bad. It suggests that agree-
ments can be challenged by an advisory body. The Convention is not a legislative
body of the Union but it can present the EU and its member states with a fait accom-
pli by reshuffling their relative weight. I think that the Nice compromise was very
well balanced. Giving the population criterion such great weight ignores the fact
that the EU has to look at two aspects. One is the EU’s states and structures; the
other – its people and citizens. The draft Constitution upsets the balance.
On the Future of Europe
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I agree with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki: we should speak a positive language rather than
keep complaining. Yet, if the EU citizens remain unconvinced about the advantages
of the draft now that the document should bring them closer to the institutions and
mechanisms of the community, we can’t hope for a success of the Convention.
Let me reiterate: I think that we should be active in many ways but we must
think things over. We must bear in mind that our domestic situation is our big-
gest weakness and that it hurts our international position. Only countries with
well-structured and developing domestic conditions matter in foreign policy;
this is not what Poland can offer. Therefore, I’m afraid that our importance is
illusory, a bubble inflated by our special transatlantic relations.
Dariusz Rosati
First, Poland has had clearly set foreign policy goals over the past ten years,
and has achieved those goals. This is unique in Polish history as different orien-
tations always clashed in the history of our diplomacy. The achievement of the
strategic foreign policy goals has recently been coupled with a sound strength-
ening of the international position of Poland. This was helped by the accession
to the Euro-Atlantic structures, the way the accession proceeded, as well as re-
cent foreign policy decisions. The final stage of EU accession negotiations, espe-
cially the negotiations in Copenhagen, though irritating to some EU partners
and envied by some Central European partners, placed Poland in a position of
a country able to defend its interests. Earlier in the negotiations, Poland was
believed to be unnecessarily stubborn in standing by its position. The final out-
come proved that we were right.
Second, particularly good and special transatlantic relations with the United
States have already been mentioned several times today. The strategic decision
to take part in the military intervention in Iraq together with the United States
and Great Britain advanced Poland to the group of countries which pursue their
own policy and which matter on the international scene. It could be ironically or
half-jokingly said that never before have two hundred troops created a global
superpower. Though we are not a superpower, we’re a country which counts
more today than it did two or three years ago.
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Third, in the long run, the international position of a country depends on its
internal economic and spiritual power. I am convinced that the turbulence we
are now going through at home is only temporary.
Fourth, when applying for NATO accession, Poland wanted to join a NATO on
the terms and conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. This was our goal. At the end
of the day, we joined an organisation that is evolving. We are not really sure
whether NATO can guarantee our security the way it did twenty or thirty years
ago. Here, Polish foreign policy faces important tasks. We should try to support
a direction of NATO’s evolution which would guarantee permanent transatlantic
bonds and the presence of the USA in Europe as well as an adequate level of the
allies’ commitments to all countries. Recent problems regarding security guar-
antees for Turkey suggest that this direction of the evolution is not yet certain.
Fifth, I have a feeling that all intellectual and diplomatic resources have been
channelled to ensure a positive outcome of the negotiations and the best possi-
ble conditions of accession. This was fully successful and must be appreciated.
Yet both the debate prior to the [accession] referendum and the debate today
lack a broader vision of Europe and don’t aim at developing a Polish position on
the Europe we are heading to or the European Union of the 21st century. I must
say that I am unhappy with impromptu declarations favouring one option or
another in the discussions in the Convention. We tend to speak in favour of
some constitutional or institutional system of the EU without the slightest refer-
ence to the long-term interests of Poland. For instance, I believe that a strong
federal Europe is in the interests of Poland. I can think of at least three reasons
for this option. Bear in mind that Poland is poorer than most EU Member States
and we should strive for more solidarity between the member states as this would
provide us with greater economic benefits of EU membership. Federation, unlike
confederation, always implies more responsibility, including economic responsi-
bility, for members. The same applies to security. Poland lies on the periphery of
the European Union. East of our border is an area as yet not fully stabilised, both
politically and economically. We should be interested in close co-operation in
the EU under the umbrella of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This co-
operation is easier and more effective in a strong union of countries rather than
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in a loose confederation. Finally, Poland is a large country. With the existing de-
cision-making system we have a bigger say in a federation than in a loose union
of countries where the interests of each member are better protected as the
countries retain more sovereignty in their decisions. I don’t want to elaborate on
this, it is only one example pointing to lack of an in-depth debate.
Once an EU member state, we will face new issues which we are intellectually
and politically unprepared to tackle. One issue is that of transatlantic relations.
We don’t want to have to choose between Mum or Dad; we want NATO to re-
main what it was over the past decades. Yet there are different opinions in the
European Union. I wish we could handle the issue in a manner distanced from
day-to-day political events (such as the Iraq war), acknowledging these relations
as a community of values, a cultural community we all share. We should take
a similar approach to the relations with the east, our contribution to the Europe-
an Union. We have to reflect on how to develop the Eastern Dimension, espe-
cially with partners such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus.
One last point. Poland’s European debate, crowned with a successful referendum
result, revealed deep rifts in society, different viewpoints on our presence in Europe
and whether the presence is indeed required. There is a host of reasons for this
divide, including our historical legacy. But there is still another legacy, that of Jagiel-
lonian Poland. Our foreign policy was oriented to the east for 600 years. Poland was
absent from great European politics. Now we have to adapt to the new situation. We
have to mitigate our distrust of Europe, of the French, of Germans, of Spaniards. On
the other hand, we have to take a reasonable approach to our relations with the
east, and to identify all potential benefits and threats of those relations.
In conclusion, two comments on Mr Mazowiecki’s intervention. I agree that
Poland should not be a satellite. However, I have never thought of Polish gov-
ernment policy as supporting everything and anything proposed by the USA;
this is not the case. I think that our attitude to the USA and its policy was based
on the position that it is in the best interests of Poland and the Polish raison
d’état to support the USA. We were not the only country to buy US aircraft! We
know that without the support of President Clinton, Poland would have joined
NATO two or three years later. I remember the doubts raised by EU partners
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concerning our NATO membership. The USA has played a most positive role in
helping Polish interests time and time again over the past decade. A cost and
benefit analysis of these relations implies that they are good for Poland.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki
But my doubts are about the situation today!
Dariusz Rosati
Our presence in Iraq can lead to doubts. I think there was no good explana-
tion whether and how Poland will benefit politically (and economically) by sup-
porting the allies’ intervention in Iraq and participating in the management pro-
gramme. The course of events was so fast that apparently there was little time
for reflection. I think it would be good for the Polish political scene to discuss
views of Poland’s presence in Iraq. As has been said, it is but a small step from
grandeur to ridicule.
Aleksander Smolar
I want to ask several questions about the relations between Poland and the
USA and the relations within Europe. Mr Rosati mentioned the frequently used
(and abused) terms Dad and Mum standing for the USA and the European Union.
Polish foreign policy has been saying for ten years now that there is no embarras
de choix. But yes, there is! There is a choice to be made between a part of Europe
and the United States. We would rather not have to choose but we are making
the choice. In addition, US policy towards Europe is evolving. How are we to
evaluate Polish foreign policy in this context?
The USA have supported European integration for decades. Now Washington
is signalling its changing position. I will quote one statement. At a Brookings
Institute conference in April 2003, Richard Hass, a former senior officer at the
Department of State, asked about US policy towards Europe, said: “Desegrega-
tion”. I am not saying that it is the official policy of the US administration. Yet,
this statement comes from the moderate wing of the administration rather than
the neoconservatives who are much more aggressive about Europe.
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The common values and interests of Europe and the United States remain
key. However, areas of competition and divergent interests are equally impor-
tant. I have a question about these. There is no doubt that we benefit from our
relations with the USA. One could even say that we have used them consciously
or unconsciously in European politics in order to strengthen our position. Even
the growing importance of the Weimar Triangle in the policies of Germany and
France seems to be a consequence of our present position in the transatlantic
alliance. But the question that should be addressed before we engage in a cost
and benefit analysis of the policy pursued thus far is: What is the role of Poland
in the European policy of the United States?
Another question is about the dramatic asymmetry between day-to-day mun-
dane issues we will have to face in the early years of our EU membership and the
apparent ease of relations with the USA which are much simpler. Paradoxically,
we may psychologically distance ourselves from Europe as we become a full
member of the EU. The language of Polish politics, mentioned by Jan Krzysztof
Bielecki, may favour this process.
Minister Cimoszewicz mentioned the risk that Polish policy may be sidelined.
We may have no choice as a consequence of our own position and approach to
the EU, and cause serious problems in Europe.
Bear in mind that the change of the voting system proposed by the Convention
is not only an issue for Poland. I’m not in favour of discarding the Nice formula. Yet
it is all part of a global shakeout that is to make the Union more effective. The
relative number of votes granted to Germany leads to a significant weakening of
the position of Spain, as well as France, the UK and Italy. What, therefore, of our
possibly more positive approach to the proposals of the Convention, and what of
our room for manoeuvre in other areas of the EU’s internal relations?
Jerzy Jedlicki
I share Mr Mazowiecki’s doubts and worries, especially about Iraq. I’m afraid
the question will soon be asked in Poland: What are we doing in Iraq? The ques-
tion is already being asked in the USA! I don’t accept the argument that since we
have contributed symbolically to the war, we have to contribute less symbolical-
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ly to the occupation of Iraq. Moreover, no weapons of mass destruction have
been found in Iraq, which undermines the original rationale for our presence
there. We now say that we have helped our Iraqi friends to get rid of a tyrant
ruler. Correct me if I’m wrong, but I don’t think we were asked for help. After the
expedition of the Polish Legion to San Domingo, this is the second time the
Polish army is an occupant. Let’s call a spade a spade. We are occupants of
a people unhappy to welcome strangers who want to regulate their internal
political affairs. This could have been expected before the decision was made.
Look at the news and you will see where we will soon be when Polish troops in
Iraq have to open fire on Shiite demonstrations, Saddam’s guerrillas, or civilians.
Is the Polish government morally and politically ready to face such events?
Maciej £êtowski
I want to ask you, Mr Minister, about the determination of the Government
concerning the Nice compromise. You are speaking war. This is a deliberate choice
of a dramatic crisis, a conflict with twenty-four partners. We are alone in our posi-
tion but we are deeply convinced that we are right. I share this opinion. It is worth
our while to go to war about Nice; but since the Polish Foreign Minister speaks
war, I want to ask whether it is only a spectacular declaration, a move to raise the
stakes in a diplomatic bid before we accept a compromise, for instance the Presi-
dency in the 2 1–
2 
 year Council of Ministers? This is how wars in the EU usually end:
first you say “no” and “under no circumstances”, only to get a lucrative proposal.
But the price of the compromise must be high. What if Polish diplomacy accepts
an unsatisfactory compromise?
Another comment on Iraq. I support the decisions of the Polish government.
I think we will have to open fire on any groups attacking Polish troops: there is no
other way. The problem is, is the Polish general public convinced that the decision
was right? We are among the most pro-US societies in Europe but most Poles con-
demned the Iraq expedition. The Government said that no one was in favour of war.
Of course, no one wants war, but there was no serious dialogue with the general
public, no attempt to convince the public about the decision. If we open fire, Poles
who have not been convinced will turn their backs on this most appropriate policy.
On the Future of Europe
29
Poland in the World:
Challenges, Achievements, Threats
W³odzimierz Cimoszewicz
Let me first address the question asked by Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. I think that
we are effective; our present position proves that we are. But how do you mea-
sure effectiveness in day-to-day politics? You always need some distance, some
perspective from which to look at issues involved. Naturally, some initiatives fail,
others are a success. I am aware that some initiatives fall through. The reasons
for failure are often other than lack of skill or commitment. Objective factors
prevail. For instance, difficulties in developing more favourable economic co-
operation with Russia are due to Poland’s weaker position. We have no trump
cards which would encourage the Russian Government to support economic co-
operation with Poland. We have presented twenty-nine Polish proposals about
Kaliningrad and only one was approved (not that it has been implemented). We
have to bear these limitations in mind.
I agree that mechanisms of regional co-operation have proliferated. They arose
at different times. Questions are often asked: How are they different? How to
define their goals? How are we to differentiate between the roles of the OSCE
and of the Council of Europe? How does the Central European Initiative stand
out among other forums of co-operation? Apparently, it is easier to establish
organisations than to change them, control them, and close them down once
they have accomplished their mission. This year we are presiding the Central
European Initiative, trying to redefine its goals and simplify its structure.
Concerning the issue of co-ordinating European policies, I think that it is of
secondary relevance who is the co-ordinator, the Prime Minister’s Office or the
Foreign Ministry. Both solutions have worked successfully. What is more impor-
tant, and as yet undecided, is the model of co-ordination. Two positions com-
pete within the Government. Some support the formation of a strong, extensive
monitoring and co-ordinating centre while others believe that we should strength-
en European affairs structures in all the ministries and agencies involved. I per-
sonally think that European affairs should remain a responsibility of Govern-
ment administration. We cannot invent a mechanism that would take over the
responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of the Environment, etc.
But we must devise solutions ensuring effective monitoring and co-ordination.
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It is too early to judge these issues. I believe that the Government should make
these important decisions as soon as possible since we have little time before
1 May 2004. We have to try out organisational solutions now in order to avoid
paying a high price for wrong decisions in the future.
I agree with Tadeusz Mazowiecki that domestic politics have or may have
some impact on the external position of the country. Especially if Poland were
to become a politically unstable country ruled by fractions pursuing irrespon-
sible policies at home and abroad. Today, our situation at home arouses some
concerns, but these do not affect our international position. It is little consola-
tion, yet few countries in today’s Europe have avoided serious internal prob-
lems in government, effective governance, economic decisions, public financ-
es, and social affairs. Yet, unlike Dariusz Rosati, I am not content to optimisti-
cally conclude that we shall overcome these temporary turbulences. The
problem is more profound, but I do not want to elaborate now. I think it is
simplistic to attribute weaknesses and pathologies only to the political class
now in power. This is a serious affliction of the entire political class. Unless we
discuss it openly, there will be no panacea, only measures used to hit individ-
uals rather than resolve actual problems.
Many speakers have discussed the Iraq issue for good reasons. Theoretically,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the course of events will follow a worst case
scenario. What can we conclude as a result? I believe that we have to maximise the
probability of the best case scenario and minimise the likelihood of an adverse
course of events while we realise that some factors are beyond our control. This is
why we are taking many initiatives. It was no coincidence that before the troops
were sent, I visited Teheran to present our intentions to the Iran government (and
the leaders of Iranian Shiites), to outline our plans of developing relations with
the population and the religious leaders of our sector, and to reassure them that
we will respect the sacred sites of the Shiites and give safe access to Shiite pil-
grims. We are talking to all interested parties about our presence in Iraq.
I understand that we are in dispute. I also understand the emotional under-
tones; but we are not going to Iraq as an occupant, this is not our intention. Even
if the UN Security Council resolution uses the term “occupant forces”, it is used
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in the sense of international law and the Geneva Conventions. Moreover, we
realised the possible reaction in Poland to the Polish troops being called occupi-
ers. We acted to make sure that Resolution 1483 only uses the term with regard
to US and British troops. And, to reiterate, only in the sense of international law
since the term “occupant forces” implies a status and authority to temporarily
administer the relevant country. There is no pejorative meaning, so typical of
political and colloquial use.
We will soon see how we are welcomed by the Iraqi people; we will make
best efforts to ensure their understanding. We are doing our best to prepare our
troops. We are talking to all stakeholders in the sector. We are trying to mini-
mise the probability of conflict. Of course, it cannot be ruled out completely.
I realise that anti-Americanism is one of the reasons for the dramatic events in
Iraq. But I have no illusions! What is happening in Iraq has nothing to do with
the Iraqi people fighting against an occupant; it is the BAAS party and people
close to Saddam Hussein’s regime trying to seize control. Bear in mind that what-
ever their views, many are fighting out of a sense of helplessness and lack of
subsistence. Hence the idea to pay out wages to the Iraqi soldiers. Hence the
idea to reconstruct the Iraqi military under the control of the allies. Bear in mind
that thousands of people recently in power in Iraq have been removed from
power forever. They have no reason to cheer, quite the opposite.
We will see whether foreign instigators of the resistance in Iraq come to light
in the future. It is clear what the best case scenario for Iraq implies for many
countries in the region. Many are happy that Saddam has been overthrown but
are concerned that a relatively democratic country ruled by law will soon be
their close neighbour. This will be a challenge to the regimes of these countries.
It is one aspect of the complexity of the situation.
Jerzy Jedlicki said with irony that we have not been asked to come up with
fraternal assistance. We are not offering fraternal assistance and I believe that
there is no reason to feel embarrassed or ashamed. We have helped to disman-
tle one of the most vicious regimes of the last decades. Why should we feel
ashamed? Because the regime can no more murder tens of thousands of peo-
ple? Is this why we should feel remorseful? We understand that the decision to
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intervene was controversial from the standpoint of international law, but we
had two goals which we clearly communicated to the general public. We were
convinced that Iraq did not fulfil its international obligations, including the elim-
ination of weapons of mass destruction. Today you can say that it was a mistake
since there were no weapons of mass destruction. I call for intellectual integrity:
don’t jump to conclusions. Time will tell.
I know that the situation today is uncomfortable because weapons of mass de-
struction seemed easy to find, which did not happen. But I think there are no reasons
to believe that the weapons were destroyed. What’s more, it is more probable that
weapons, especially chemical weapons, were hidden in Iraq or taken abroad than
that they were destroyed. Why were UN inspectors being misled, kept away from
certain locations and finally thrown out of Iraq four years ago? Iraq had no weapons
of mass destruction and threw out the inspectors? Why should Iraq destroy the weap-
ons once it removed all witnesses and was at no risk of disclosure? Why should it
destroy the weapons just before the military intervention? If it did destroy the weap-
ons before the intervention, it could have produced evidence and avoided the likely
military attack. Let me repeat: it is too early to draw definitive conclusions.
Another goal we had was to improve transatlantic relations. When Europe
strongly opposed US politics and European allies refused to co-operate and some
even warned that they would block a UN Security Council resolution under all
circumstances, it was in the best interests of Poland and the transatlantic commu-
nity to demonstrate to the USA that they have partners and should not turn their
back on Europe. We were not the only ones to take this position. If you count the
NATO members and accession countries, most of them backed the USA.
Am I ready morally and politically for such difficult situations? Let me repeat:
myself, my colleagues and other Polish politicians are making best efforts to
ensure most positive developments. Our troops will have detailed instructions,
will only use arms in self-defence, in extreme situations. Recent events suggest
that many incidents involving US troops (and in one case British troops) were
due to mistakes made by soldiers. Lessons must be learned. I am not saying that
we are more cautious but we have extensive experience including peace-keep-
ing operations in difficult conditions. I hope there will be no dramatic events.
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A question was asked about the Government’s commitment to defend the
Nice agreement. We are fully committed! I think that our European partners
have pushed us into a corner. It was a mistake and we have to be open about it
rather than play games. I disagree with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki who talked about
the language we speak in negotiations with the European Union. It is not the
case that others speak in a positive way while we go for confrontation. We ap-
preciate the success of the Convention. We have publicly said that more was
achieved than generally expected. But this does not mean that we can’t raise
objections. By the way, the tactic of speaking in a positive fashion nearly caused
a problem. Several days before the Thessaloniki meeting Foreign Ministers met
in Luxembourg and agreed to adopt a formula defining the Constitutional Trea-
ty drafted by the Convention as a “good basis for the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence.” Yet in the conference, since most countries praised the advantages of the
draft, the Dutch Foreign Minister was prompted to propose a changed formula
whereby the draft would be a good basis for the European Constitution rather
than the Conference. Had the proposal been accepted, we and others would find
it difficult to discuss the draft. I believe in open discussion and argumentation
about potential limits. If we are talking to a responsible partner who also cares
about the successful outcome, they will understand our situation. To summarise,
we are fully committed to this issue.
We are also raising other objections, including the preamble to the Consti-
tution. We will try to convince others about our arguments but we are not
indifferent to others’ argumentation. I do not want to describe the details of
our negotiations but during the recent visit of Cardinal Angelo Sodano I felt
that the Church was aware that our proposal was not bound to succeed. At the
same time, the Catholic Church takes note of at least two other provisions of
the draft Constitution important to churches and denominations. And another
proposal we are making: the President of the Commission should be elected
by the Parliament from among two candidates proposed by the European Coun-
cil. We think this would give the European Parliament a more serious status.
Meanwhile, the draft Treaty preserves the existing system: the European Council
elects one candidate approved by the Parliament.
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Concerning other comments: Mr Smolar said that the change of the voting
system applies to Poland as well as other countries which apparently accept the
change. We will see at the Intergovernmental Conference. It is for each country
to decide: if they are happy about the change, it is up to them. Let me repeat: we
neither want to, nor are we able to accept this solution.
We can imagine future areas of dispute in the European Union. To follow up
on Mr Rosati’s intervention: What should the future Europe be like? You were
right to say that it should be based on solidarity. The principle should hold. Yet
even today EU discussions on the future of some community policies, such as
the structural policy, abound in views contradicting the solidarity principle. It is
proposed that it be “renationalised”. What does it mean for us? If this line of
thinking is pursued, a divide would open between the well-developed countries
of “old” EU and the newly acceding countries which are hoping for a positive
effect of the structural policy. If you translate this clear rift in opinions into the
two voting systems, the Nice system and the one proposed in the European
Constitution, the implications of the change become clear. Is it in line with the
philosophy of European solidarity? We believe that the Nice compromise is clos-
er to the principles of the EU, including the solidarity principle.
Mr Smolar said that there is an objective choice between the USA and Europe,
or at least its part. In addition, with the evolution of US interests, the relative
importance of Europe is diminishing. I believe that shared interests are of funda-
mental importance in various areas, especially security as today’s threats loom
equally over both America and Europe. There are also many global problems of
development, environment, poverty which cannot be resolved effectively with-
out co-operation between Europe and America.
Naturally, there are differences of opinion, but I don’t think that the divide is
growing wider. We shouldn’t overestimate the difference in defence capacity,
although it is quite real. Today and even more so in the future, politicians who
want to measure the effectiveness of US policy in the world with its military ca-
pacity realise that it is not sufficient. The military capacity impressively won the
war in Iraq, but it is not enough. To follow up with effective actions, the measures
adopted have to be truly international. I believe that Iraq will be a lesson to those
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who thought that the USA can do everything unilaterally. It is an argument in the
debate about unilateralism vs. multilateralism, although the debate is very com-
plex. To promote responsible multilateralism, we have to ensure effective and
efficient mechanisms, structures and organisations which support multilateral
decisions. As long as everyone says that the UN should play a leading role but
refrain from actions supporting the UN, we are only talking. Nothing will ever
change if international organisations are doomed to be ineffective due to their
internal mechanisms, constellations of interests, lack of political will, etc. In this
context, the action of the UN Security Council in the case of Iraq is discouraging as
it undermines the impact of such mechanisms as the UN. Fortunately, a lesson
was learned, as demonstrated in the adoption of Resolution 1483.
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